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A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO HOME
INSTRUCTION?
NEAL DEVINS*
Parental and scholarly dissatisfaction with the public school system
is increasingly evident. In the spring of 1983, the National Commission
on Educational Excellence issued A Nation at Risk,1 a report demand-
ing the restoration of core curriculum requirements and discipline in
our public schools. In 1981, James Coleman, a University of Chicago
sociologist, released a study demonstrating that private schools do a
better job educating our young than public schools do.' These two
studies, among other things, have led parents to reconsider the viability
of public schools. A recent survey, for example, found that 25.5% of
parents with school age children would send their children to private
schools if Congress enacted President Reagan's Tuition Tax Credit
proposal,3 which would allow parents a $250 tax credit for private
school expenditures.
The rapid growth of home instruction is one of the most dramatic
reactions against our public schools.4 Approximately thirty thousand
families now practice home instruction, which entails the complete re-
moval of the child from the institutional educational environment.5
* Staff Attorney for United States Commission on Civil Rights, Washington, D.C. B.A.
Georgetown Univ.; J.D. Vanderbilt Univ. Mr. Devins completed this Article while he was Direc-
tor of the Religious Liberty and Private Education Project at Vanderbilt University. The Institute
for Education Affairs supported the research for this project. The views expressed in this Article
are solely those of the author. Mr. Devins would like to thank Deborah S. Vick for her thoughtful
comments.
1. The National Commission on Excellence in Education, A Nation at Risk. The Imperative
of Educational Reform (1983).
2. J. COLEMAN, T. HOFFER, S. KILGORE, HIGH SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT: PUBLIC, CATHOLIC
AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS COMPARED (1982).
3. Congressionally Mandated Study of School Finance Final Report: Vol. 2, Private Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education, Report to Congress from Secretary of Education, 68 (1983).
4. Similar to the home study movement in its criticism of public education is the Christian
day school movement. Christian day schools, with current enrollments of approximately one mil-
lion students, are the fastest growing segment of institutional private education. For a general
discussion of Christian school opposition to public education, see Carper, The Christian Day
School Movement, 1960-1982, 17 EDUC. F. 135 (1983); Devins, State Regulation of Christian
Schools, 10 J. LEGIs. 351 (1983) [hereinafter cited as State Regulation]; Devins, Fundamentalist
Schools vs. the Regulators, Wall St. J., Apr. 14, 1983, at 26, col. 3.
5. See Lines, Private Education and State Regulation, 12 J. L. & EDUC. 189, 197 n.8 (1983);
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Although most parents who seek to educate their children at home are
dedicated and sincere, several states have enacted statutes that severely
restrict or even eliminate the home instruction alternative.
The parents' right to teach their children in the home is premised on
the parent-child bond. The primacy of this parent-child bond is be-
yond dispute.6 In most situations, the state must demonstrate abuse or
neglect before it can interfere with this relationship. 7 Yet some individ-
uals contend that in education, government regulations should promote
a state-selected system of values.8 Comprehensive state regulatory
schemes reflect this view for they frequently severely limit parental
choice among educational alternatives. 9
Increasingly parents are going to court to challenge restrictive state
education procedures on both statutory and constitutional grounds. On
constitutional grounds, parents claim that these procedures deprive
them of their fundamental right, protected by the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment, to direct the upbringing of their children. 10
On statutory grounds, parents argue that their home study program sat-
isfies vague "equivalency with public schools" statutes, I or that their
home should be viewed as a private school for purposes of state com-
pulsory education laws. 12 These parents usually recognize that the
state has authority to demand that its young attain minimum academic
competence in a basic curriculum.'3 Some states, however, contend
that only through the total prohibition of home instruction or the de-
velopment of comprehensive standards to regulate home instruction
can they meet their compelling responsibility to ensure that every child
in the state receives an adequate education. 14
This Article attempts to define the boundaries of permissible state
authority in the home schooling context. The underlying thesis of this
Ward, What Happens When Parents Turn Teachers, N.Y. Times Winter Survey of Education, Jan.
10, 1982, sec. 13 at 3.
6. See infra notes 67-81, 95-122 & 213-21 and accompanying text.
7. See generally Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Weglected" Children: A Search for
Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985 (1978).
8. See infra notes 203 & 204.
9. See infra notes 43 & 44 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 112-22 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 176 & 177.
12. See infra notes 157-61 & 170-72 and accompanying text.
13. See Ball, Religious Liberty New Issues and Past Decisions, in A BLUEPRINT FOR JUDI-
cIAL REFORM, 327-49 (P. McCuligan & R. Rader, eds. 1981).
14. See infra notes 43 & 44.
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Article is that the state cannot prohibit or render meaningless the home
study option. At the same time, the state has authority to insist that
students taught at home learn as much as their public school counter-
parts. Supreme Court decisions recognize the fundamental nature of
both a parent's child-rearing interest 5 and religious freedom. 16 Also,
writings in the fields of developmental psychology 7 and educational
theory,' 8 as well as writings concerning the role of education in an open
political system, recognize the parents' special interest in directing their
child's education.
This Article is divided into four sections. The first section is devoted
to an overview of both the reasons why parents choose to teach their
children at home and the types of regulations used by the state to gov-
ern home instruction. 19 The next section discusses the basis for the
state's authority to intervene in family education matters and due pro-
cess limitations on such intervention.2" State authority over family
matters is based on its collectivist interest in an educated populace and
its parenspatriae interest in the wellbeing of its youth. One limitation
on the state's authority is the parents' fundamental right to direct the
religious upbringing of their children. This fundamental right is not
absolute, however, because the state may reasonably regulate educa-
tional alternatives.
The third section of this Article systematically describes court rulings
on the home instruction issue.2' This section begins with a discussion
of two recent lawsuits that challenge total prohibition of home instruc-
tion. These cases may provide significant insight into the scope of legit-
imate state authority over the home study alternative. The remainder
of this section highlights the limited precedential value of other state
cases on the issue whether the state can constitutionally prohibit or
make meaningless the home study option. Failure on the part of states'
and parents' attorneys either to raise significant issues or to introduce
evidence to support their claims is a prime cause of the courts' inability
to speak clearly on this issue. Additionally, many of these cases raise
15. See infra notes 67-81, 95-122 & 213-21 and accompanying text.
16, See infra notes 93 & 200.
17. See authorities cited infra notes 213 & 214.
18. See infra notes 205-10 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 23-54 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 55-129 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 130-99 and accompanying text.
Number 3]
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 62:435
narrow statutory issues, which do not lend themselves to constitutional
extrapolations.
The final section of this Article is a critical analysis of arguments
used by the states to justify governmental interference with the fam-
ily 2 2 This section attempts to explain the limited reach of the state's
communitarian and parenspatriae interests. In the home study context,
this limited state interest is sufficient to justify regulations governing
hours of core curriculum, length of school day and school year, student
reporting, and competency examinations. More expansive regulations
unconstitutionally interfere with the fundamental parent-child bond.
I. THE NATURE OF THE CONTROVERSY
Parents teach their children at home for a number of reasons. Not
surprisingly, the most common of these reasons is dissatisfaction with
the public school system.2 3 These dissenting parents share a common
disenchantment with the academic and social environments of public
schools.2' For these parents, the state, if left to its own devices, will
create a monolithic educational structure that will stamp out "the
needed diversity for a truly free society."25 These parents also are fear-
22. See infra notes 200-29 and accompanying text.
23. For an expanded discussion of parental dissatisfaction with the public school system, see
Devins, State Regulation, supra note 4, at 355-59.
24. See S. ARONS, COMPELLING BELIEF 75-134 (1983); Carper, supra note 4, at 281-282.
25. J. WHITEHEAD, THE NEW TYRANNY 3 (1982). According to Stephen Arons, the public
school inculcates in its students a set of state-selected values:
[t]he values in which public school students must confess belief include the following:
1. Authority in society should be organized hierarchically, and it is appropriate for
those of less authority to cultivate attributes of obedience and passivity.
2. Truth is prescribed and established by authority and learning means understand-
ing and accepting the official version of reality.
3. Material acquisition, rather than spiritual condition, is the most significant meas-
ure of personal success and social progress; and measurement, rather than intuition, de-
fines knowledge.
4. Competition is more important than cooperation.
5. The ability to follow directions is more important than creativity, and dissent is
either the result of poor communication, willful misanthropy, or emotional instability.
No single family articulates the values underlying public schooling in just this lan-
guage; and all the families offended by beliefs they see enshrined in public schools do not
agree on which values constitute public orthodoxy. The list of offensive school beliefs
grows, however, with each conversation one has with "unschoolers."
6. Poverty, malnutrition, disease, oppression, and violence are not created by anyone
who lives according to society's rules, and people in general should perform whatever
acts are required by their "roles" without ethical discomfort.
7. Compulsion and coercion are acceptable means of creating proper behavior, in-
cluding learning.
8. There are specific character attributes associated with race, gender, class, and age
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss3/4
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ful of the "moral breakdown" in our public schools, which they associ-
ate with lack of discipline, social permissiveness, and drug and alcohol
abuse.26
Parents also seek to teach their children at home for religious rea-
sons. Some Christian educators and parents, for example, believe that
public schools have become too "secularized," with the result that reli-
gious values no longer have a place in public education.27 This lack of
religion in public education can partially be attributed to Supreme
Court decisions that prohibited organized prayer,28 Bible reading,
29
and the posting of the Ten Commandments in public schools.30 The
inclusion of sex education and evolution courses in the public school
curriculum, which some Christian educators find morally objection-
able, exacerbates this problem."
In addition to their religion-based criticisms of the public schools,
Christian educators also seek to advance a particular set of religious
values through home education. These educators believe that educa-
tion should be inherently religious and thus oppose state efforts to li-
cense their home study programs.32 In court, Christian educators and
parents argue that state efforts to limit or prohibit home instruction
deprive them "of their liberty to freely carry out their religious mission
in the form of Christian education. . ... "1 Parents who wish to teach
their children at home may base their actions on two constitutionally
that cannot be changed and upon which may be based the distribution of power, wealth,
and dignity.
9. Institutional schooling contributes to the progress of the individual and society,
upgrades general morality, reduces prejudice, and protects each rising generation from
the mistakes of the previous generation.
10. Manual labor can never attain the dignity or power of intellectual labor, and art,
music and mysticism are nonessential.
S. ARONS, supra note 24, at 100-01.
26. See D. Ham, Reasons Why Parents Enroll Their Children in Fundamentalist Christian
Schools (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri at Columbia, 1982). Along with
a general "moral breakdown" in the schools, parents also claim they are concerned with the de-
crepitation of schools, asbestos, and other dangers.
27. See Rice, Conscientious Objecion to Public Education: The Grievance and the Remedies,
1978 B.Y.U. L. REv. 847; Whitehead & Conlan, he Establishment of the Religion of Secular
Humanism and Its First 4mendment Implication, 10 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 1 (1978).
28. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
29. Abington School Dist. v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
30. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
31. See Rice, supra note 27.
32. See Devins, Fundamentalist Schools and the Law, Chris. Sci. Mon., Sept. 22, at 23 coL 4.
33. Bangar Baptist Church v. State, 549 F. Supp. 1208, 1216 (D. Me. 1982) (citing plaintiff's
petition). See also Duro v. District Attorney, 712 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1983); State v. Moorehead, 308
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protected rights. First, the parents' right to direct the upbringing of
their child is protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.34 Second, the parents' right to protect the religious up-
bringing of their child is protected by the free exercise clause of the first
amendment.35
Parental desires to direct their children's education often conflict
with state laws and regulations governing home instruction. Because
education is not a fundamental right protected by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment,36 courts afford the state great lee-
way in developing the contours of its educational system. The author-
ity of the state to promulgate reasonable regulations to govern all forms
of schooling is beyond doubt. In Runyon v. McCrary,37 the Supreme
Court noted that the constitutional prohibition against government reg-
ulation of child-rearing decisions does not similarly restrict the govern-
ment from regulating parental decisions concerning their child's
education.38 In addition, the Runyon Court indicated that a constitu-
tional right to send children to private schools does not mean that pri-
vate schools could not be subjected to reasonable government
regulation.39 In a similar vien, the Court noted in Gillette v. United
States,4" that "neutral prohibitory or regulatory laws having secular
aims may impose certain 'incidental burdens' on free exercise when
'the burden on First Amendment values is. . .justifiable in the terms
of the Government's valid aims."'4 1 The determination of whether a
regulation is reasonable ultimately rests with the judiciary. The judici-
ary has afforded states a great deal of discretion in determining what
sorts of regulations ought to govern education. 42
N.W.2d 60 (Iowa 1981); State v. Staver, 294 N.W.2d 883 (N.D. 1980); State v. Riddle, 285 S.E.2d
359 (V. Va. 1981).
34. See infra notes 112-29 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 82-99 and accompanying text.
36. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); see also Goldstein,
Interdistrict Inequalities in School Financing: A CriticalAnalysis ofSerrano v. Priest and Its Prog-
eny, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 504 (1972). But see Serrano v. Priest II, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 1929, 135
Cal. Rptr. 345, cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); Clune, Coons, & Sugarman, Educational Opportu.
nity. 4 Workable Constitutional Test for State Finance Structures, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 305 (1969).
37. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
38. Id at 178. See also authorities cited in Note, The State and Sectarian Education: Regula-
lion to Deregulation, 1980 DUKE L.J. 801, 811-12 n.59.
39. 427 U.S. at 178.
40. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
41. Id at 462.
42. For a discussion of regulations governing home study programs, see Lines, Private Educa-
[Vol. 62:435
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States that seek to limit the home instruction alternative claim that
the regulation (or even prohibition) of home instruction is necessary to
ensure adequate education of their young. The Virginia State Board of
Education, for example, sought to justify a "state approval of home
tutor" requirement by suggesting that the home study environment was
educationally deficient. The Board felt it was reasonable for the Gen-
eral Assembly to conclude that the more structured and controlled en-
vironment of an educational institution was superior to the more
relaxed and private surrounding of a home education program.43 Simi-
larly, North Carolina prohibits home instruction because the state
claims that it cannot rely on the parents to provide the necessary moti-
vation to the child to assure that the child has access to a quality educa-
tion. Unlike operators of nonpublic schools, the State believes that it
cannot rely on the existence of collective market forces in the form of
parental demands and concerns to assure that children have access to
an education and that the education provided will be of some minimal
quality." North Carolina's absolutist approach is unusual, however.
ion Alternatives and State Regulation, 12 J. LAW & ED. 189, 194-97 (1983); Tobak & Zirkel, Home
Instruction: An Analysis ofthe Statutes and Case Law, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1, 51-2 (1982). For a
comparable discussion of private school regulation, see Devins, State Regulation, supra note 4, at
361-63; P. Kinder, The Regulation and Accreditation of Nonpublic Schools in the United States
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri at Columbia, 1982).
43. mhe home environment usually is marked by relaxation, privacy, and close rela-
tionships formed by bonded lifetimes. It is reasonable for the General Assembly to
conclude that education is provided to a greater extent in an environment where disci-
pline and control is more objective, where the program and progress of study are verifia-
ble, where the teacher has a singular role as teacher, where the student has a singular role
as student and where the exclusive focus and reason for meeting is the educational
program.
Virginia Supreme Court Bars Parents' "Private School," Educ. Daily, Dec. 9, 1982, at 7. See also
People v. Turner, 121 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 861, 263 P.2d 685 (1953), appeal dismissed, 347 U.S. 972
(1954) (parents teaching at home needed teaching certificate while teachers in private schools did
not need a certificate). For the Turner court:
The most obvious reason for such difference in treatment is ... the difficulty in super-
vising without unreasonable expense a host of individuals, widely scattered, who might
undertake to instruct individual children in their homes as compared with the less diffi-
cult and expensive supervision of teachers in organized private schools.
Id at 864, 263 P.2d at 688.
44. Appellant's Brief at 14, Duro v. District Attorney, 712 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. de-
nied, 104 S. Ct. 998 (1984). In his book, Compelling Brief, Stephen Arons noted:
Home-schooling controversies in effect bring out the ideological defense of government
schooling:
I. The problem of conflict between families and schools is one of balancing the inter-
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Thirty-four states permit some form of home instruction.45
Regulation of home education varies considerably among the states
that allow home instruction. At one extreme, Louisiana allows parents
to teach their children at home with minimal supervision. Parents need
only provide the State Board of Education with a proposed home study
program and have their children take a standardized achievement test
at the end of each school year.46 At the other extreme, Michigan re-
quires that "teachers for home instruction must be certified and instruc-
tion must be comparable to that provided in public schools. '47
Among those states that permit home instruction, it is often difficult
to ascertain what parents must do to have a home study program ap-
proved by the state or local education authority. The primary reason
for this confusion is that twenty-one states allow home instruction by
permitting "equivalent" or "comparable" instruction outside of
schools. 48 The determination of equivalency, as might be expected,
varies considerably from state to state and from district to district
within a state.49
ests of the two. Parents do have important rights and responsibilities, but society has the
predominant responsibility for family morals and beliefs....
2. One of the obligations of the public that can legitimately be carried out through
school policy is the protection of children from "bad" parenting. ....
3. . . . Home schooling does not respect the right of children to differ from parents
and impose an even more rigid orthodoxy upon a dissenting child than any school sys-
tem could.
4. School is an essential force of social cohesion....
5. The socialization of children in groups is essential. Only through peer-group
schooling can children learn to get along in a highly independent society.
6. The mixing of children from different backgrounds and from families with differ-
ing beliefs and values is vital to peace in a pluralistic society ...
7. The adequate function of the American democratic system requires that every
child be taught the values of liberty as well as the skills of literacy....
8. Children who are educated at home.. . may become a social burden in a com-
plex society and may be deprived of economic opportunity.
S. ARONS, supra note 24, at 121-23.
45. See Tobak & Zirkel, supra note 42, at 12.
46. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:236 (West 1982). See also Marcus, As Busing Begins in
Schools, Louisiana Clears Wayfor Teaching in Homes, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1981 at 14a, col. 1.
47. A.G. Op. No. 5579, Sept. 27, 1979 (interpreting MIcH. CoMP. LAWS § 380.1561 (1979)).
48. The following states have "equivalency" exceptions: Alabama, California, Connecticut,
Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Vermont, and Wisconsin. Tobak & Zirkel, supra note 42, at 6-10. Nine of these states have clear-
cut regulatory provisions, however. Alabama, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Iowa,
New York, Rhode Island, and South Dakota. Id
49. Two decisions by the Rhode Island commissioner of education demonstrate this variance.
In the case of Linda Rothwell, the state approved the home study program of a "dedicated and
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss3/4
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Several states have statutory or regulatory guidelines governing
home instruction. The most stringent of these guidelines specify
teacher qualifications. Five states allow home instruction only if a
teacher is certified, which rules out most parents.5" Four states demand
that teachers be "competent," paving the way for inconsistent rulings of
the meaning of "competence."' I Other requirements govern the length
of the school day and academic year and the nature of classroom
materials.5 2
State regulation that does not explicitly provide for home instruction
and only implicitly refers to home instruction by way of open-ended
"equivalency" statutes appears to be a thing of the past. The phenome-
nal growth of home schooling-in conjunction with state legislative
dissatisfaction with recent court rulings-is spurring the development
of more specific guidelines in several states.53 These regulations un-
doubtedly will give rise to increased litigation. Parents will challenge
the constitutionality of these provisions on due process and religious
liberty grounds. In addition, a similar rise in litigation will occur in
those states where state and local education officials interpret
"equivalency" statutes in a restrictive manner. Home instruction is be-
coming a great source of conflict between religious sectors and the
state.54
II. PARENTS V. THE STATE
The conflict between the parent's interest in directing the educational
and religious upbringing of their children and the state's interest in the
adequate education of its youth is the subject of an ongoing legal con-
troversy. An understanding of both of these interests is necessary to
concerned parent." Mrs. Rothwell was a high school graduate. Yet, in the case of Brigitta Van
Dam, the state refused to approve the Van Dam home study program. Interestingly, the Van
Dam children performed well on school administered tests. Additionally, Mrs. Van Dam has a
master's degree in art education. See Ward, supra note 5.
50. Alabama, California, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. Tobak & Zirkel, supra note
42, at 6-10.
51. Arizona, Hawaii, New York, South Dakota. See id
52. See id at 12.
53. Crary, Educators Expect Fight Over Minimum Private-School Standards, Denver Post,
Aug. 11, 1981, at 3, col. I (Colorado attempted to establish private-school standards without con-
sidering the Christian educator's perspective).
54. John Whitehead, an attorney who represents religious causes, predicts that home instruc-
tion will be the most significant contemporary legal issue facing the Christian community. See
Devins, State Regulation, supra note 4, at 361-62.
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answer the question whether parents have a constitutional right to in-
struct their children in the home.
Education is one of the state's most compelling responsibilities. In
Brown v. Board of Education,55 for example, the Supreme Court
commented:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of the state and
local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great ex-
penditures for education demonstrate our recognition of the importance
of education to our democratic society . . . in these days, it is doubtful
that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is de-
nied the opportunity to an education.5 6
Philip Kurland similarly noted the central role of schooling in the
"American dream." According to Kurland, in America, education be-
came the great equalizer. Individuals could raise their consciousness,
ethics, culture, or earning power through education. These benefits to
the individual translated into benefits to society. "Thus the United
States became one of the most schooled societies in the history of
man.
57
Because education is not a fundamental right,-8 courts are reluctant
to interfere with state regulations and procedures governing the struc-
ture of education. 9 The Supreme Court consistently has emphasized
that public education is a matter of state and local concern and that
federal courts should refrain from intervening in the daily operation of
schools unless there is a clear violation of the Constitution.60 The well-
being of children is clearly within the authority of the state to regulate
and protect.6 ' State power over the child may extend even beyond the
exercise of constitutional rights by the parents. In Prince v. Massachu-
setts,62 for example, the Supreme Court upheld child labor laws over a
legitimate free exercise claim. In so doing, the Court held that neither
religion nor parenthood place the family beyond state regulation in the
55. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
56. Id at 493. See also cases cited in Clune, Coons, & Sugarman, supra note 36, at 376-78.
57. Kurland, The Supreme Court, Compulsory Education, and the First Amendment'r Religion
Clauses, 75 W. VA. L. REv. 213, 215 (1973).
58. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
59. Ironically, the state also has great authority to govern the structure of education because
education is one of the state's most compelling responsibilities. See supra note 56 and accompany-
ing text.
60. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
61. Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
62. 321 U.S. 158 (1943).
[Vol. 62:435
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public interest.63 Acting to guard the general interest in its youths'
well-being, the state may restrict the parents' control by requiring regu-
lar school attendance or prohibiting child labor.'
State intervention in the parent-child relationship can be justified
under one of two standards. One standard governs state intervention
pursuant to the state's interest as a collective entity. The other standard
governs state intervention on behalf of the child as a developing indi-
vidual.65  The state's collectivist interest is merely an exercise of the
state police power designed to promote the public welfare.66
The scope of the legitimate governmental interference with the par-
ent-child relationship on collectivist grounds is quite narrow. Judicial
recognition of the fundamental nature of the parent-child bond man-
dates strict scrutiny of state efforts to interfere with that relationship.
In Prince v. Massachusets,67 for example, the Supreme Court noted
that "[it is cardinal with us that the custody, care, and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hin-
der."' 68 In Roe v. Wade, 69 the Supreme Court elaborated on the Prince
ruling by suggesting that the fundamental privacy concept has "some
extension" to family relationships.70
63. Id at 166. The Prince Court also recognized the primacy of parental authority over their
children. See infra note 68.
64. 321 U.S. at 166.
65. See Knudsen, The Education of the Amish Child, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1506, 1511-17 (1974);
Project, Education and the Law: State Interests and Individual Rights, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1373
(1976); Note, State Intrusion into Family Affairs: Justfcations and Limitations, 26 STAN. L. REV.
1383 (1974).
66. Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Fami, 93 HARV. L. Rav. 1156, 1199
(1980) ("A large number of state ends have been considered legitimate objectives of the police
power, including the promotion not only of the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare,
but also more abstract goals like aesthetic and family values.").
67. 321 U.S. 158 (1943).
68. d at 166. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), for example, the Supreme Court
stated that "to marry, establish a home, and bring up children" is a constitutionally protected form
of liberty. Id at 399.
69. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
70. Id at 152-56. Similarly, in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1973), the
Supreme Court invalidated a zoning ordinance that prohibited extended family members from
residing in a single family dwelling because "freedom of personal choice in matters and family life
is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id at
499. The plurality opinion was of the view that "[o]ur decisions establish that the Constitution
protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in
this nation's history and tradition." Id at 503-04. Similarly, in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972), the Court invalidated a state statute providing that illegitimate children, upon the death of
Number 3]
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Strict scrutiny analysis requires the state to demonstrate that its pro-
cedures are the least restrictive means available to effectuate some com-
pelling state interest. 7I Few state regulations governing family conduct
can pass constitutional muster under this standard.12 To justify an in-
their mother, become wards of the state without a hearing on the parental fitness of the father.
For the Court, "the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of
his or her child come[s] to this court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to
liberties which derive mainly from shifting economic arrangements." Id at 651. See also Cleve-
land Bd. of Educ. v. Lafleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (state must demonstrate compelling interest to
interfere even indirectly-with a woman's decision to have a child); United States v. Orito, 413
U.S. 139, 142 (1973) (constitutional right of privacy includes right of marriage, procreation, moth-
erhood, child rearing, and education); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (freedom of choice in
marital decisions); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (recognizing, in the family
context, that "the specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras ... that help give
them life and substance").
In contrast to this group of cases, the Supreme Court affirmed without opinion the district court
in Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C. 1975), a 'd without opinion, 423 U.S. 907. The
Baker court, in recognizing the legitimacy of a state's parenspatriae power in the corporal punish-
ment context, held that "parental control over childrearing" should not be considered a funda-
mental constitutional right "in the hierarchy of constitutional values." Id at 299. The Supreme
Court approved the use of corporal punishment in a subsequent decision, Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U.S. 651 (1977), without directly addressing the "fundamental rights" issue. The Court also ap-
proved an interference in the child-parent bond over a due process objection in Wyman v. James,
400 U.S. 309 (1971). Wyman held that the state's parenspatriae interest in the child was sufficient
to justify home visits by welfare caseworkers. Id at 318-24. These decisions have been severely
criticized for ignoring the primacy of the parent-child bond. See Burt, Forcing Protection on Chil-
dren and Their Parents: The Impact of Wyman v. James, 69 MICH. L. REv. 1259 (1971); Rosen-
burg, Ingraham v. Wright: The Supreme Court's WhOping Boy, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 75 (1978).
For other commentaries suggesting that the courts should subject state interferences with the fam-
ily to strict scrutiny review, see Keiler, Privacy, Children and their Parents.- Reflections on and
Beyond the Supreme Courts Approach, 66 MINN. L. REv. 459 (1982); Developments in the Law,
supra note 66.
71. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITTmONAL LAW 1000-60 (1978).
72. The state has a legitimate police power interest in protecting public morals, however.
Under a rational basis analysis applied to nonfundamental interests, for example, the Supreme
Court upheld a Georgia law regulating the sale and distribution of obscene material. Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). The state's asserted interests were "in the quality of life
and in the 'mainten[ance] [of] a decent society.'" Id at 58-60 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting)). These interests are not sufficiently compelling to
justify state interference in the family relationship. In O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563
(1975), for example, the Court held that "[m]ere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitu-
tionally justify the deprivation of a person's physical liberty." Id at 575 (mental patient's consti-
tutional right to liberty violated by state confinement because he was neither dangerous nor
incapable of surviving if unconfined). The Supreme Court's decisions in Carey v. Population
Servs. Int, 431 U.S. 698 (1977), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), also reflect this view.
Carey held that there was no rational or substantial relationship between a law banning the distri-
bution of contraceptives to minors and the state's asserted interest in discouraging juvenile sexual
behavior. 431 U.S. at 706. Eisenstadt similarly held that there was no rational relationship be-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss3/4
HOME INSTRUCTION
fringement of family affairs in the name of the state's collective interest,
the state would have to demonstrate that its regulation prevents a near-
certain societal harm. For example, regulations requiring children to
be inoculated against contagious diseases embody one sufficiently
strong state interest.73 Whether less tangible dangers, such as the in-
ability of an uneducated child effectively to exercise his franchise in a
participatory democracy, constitute a sufficiently compelling state in-
terest is a more difficult question. The Court's decision to uphold child
labor laws in Prince suggested that the state might have such authority.
Yet, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,74 the Supreme Court held that the state's
interest in compulsory education was not of sufficient magnitude to
override a parent's interest in having the child exempted from public
school for religious reasons.
States also attempt to justify their efforts to interfere in family affairs
on the ground that the state has a right to protect the personal interests
of a child-the state's role as parenspatriae. The state's parenspatriae
power allows the state to interfere in family matters to protect the
child's physical, educational, and emotional well-being.75 The state
may exercise its parenspatriae power in the face of parental neglect.76
No bright line exists between acceptable and unacceptable parental
behavior. Clearly, the state can demand that a child receive life-saving
medical treatment.77 The line between parental punishment and child
abuse or between inattention and abandonment, however, is not so
clear. Until the Supreme Court's landmark 1967 decision, In re
tween restricting the sale of contraceptives to minors and the state's interest in detering extramari-
tal sexual conduct. 405 U.S. at 450-53.
73. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. I1 (1905), the Supreme Court upheld the right of
the state to compel immunization of its citizens. For a discussion of the relevance of Jacobson to
the compelled immunization of minors, see Note, supra note 65, at 1390 n.43.
74. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Prince, speaking in general terms of "the crippling effects of child
labor" 321 U.S. at 168, ignored the peculiar circumstances of the case. See id at 173 (Murphy, J.,
dissenting). Yoder, on the other hand, focused on these particular circumstances. For this reason,
Philip Kurland suggested that Yoder made Prince an "unworkable precedent." Kurland, supra
note 57, at 243.
75. Note, supra note 65, at 1391-92.
76. S. KATz, WHEN PARENTS FAIL 57 (1971). (Neglect statutes "in many respects, incorpo-
rates a community's view of parenthood. Essentially, they are pronouncements of unacceptable
child practices.").
77. See, e.g., People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 344
U.S. 824 (1952); State v. Perricne, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890
(1963); In re Clark, 21 Ohio App. 2d 86, 185 N.E.2d 128 (1962).
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Gault,78 courts were fairly deferential when reviewing an exercise of a
state's parens patriae power.79 Gault held that the parens patriae doc-
trine was of "dubious relevance" in the juvenile delinquency context
and thus the state could not invoke it to immunize state delinquency
statutes from constitutional scrutiny.8" Following Gault, courts began
to invalidate certainparenspatriae xercises on procedural due process,
void-for-vagueness, substantive due process, or first amendment
grounds.8'
States justify their compulsory education laws on both collectivist
and parens patriae grounds. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,82 the Supreme
Court recognized the legitimacy of both of these state interests. The
Court approved the state's contention that "some degree of education is
necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently
in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and indepen-
dence." 3  The Court also acknowledged the state's parens patriae
rights: "Education prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-suffi-
cient participants in society."84 Justice White, concurring, recognized a
broader parens patriae interest, which included "the [state's] right to
make a 'cultural' guess, the right to be able to predict the attributes of
our future culture and design an 'educational package' to equip the
child with the necessary cultural survival skills."85 According to Justice
White, "[a] state has a legitimate interest . . . in seeking to prepare
[children] for the lifestyle that they may later choose.186
Although the Court in Yoder recognized the legitimacy of a state's
interest in mandating compulsory education, it upheld the claims of
members of the Old Order Amish Faith who sought to exempt their
children from high school attendance. First, the Court emphasized the
78. 397 U.S. 1 (1967).
79. See Developments in the Law, supra note 66, at 1221-27.
80. 397 U.S. at 44-56.
81. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1977) (substantive due process); Erznoznik v.
City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (first amendment); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 159 (1975)
(procedural due process); Davis v. Smith, 583 S.W.2d 37 (Ark. 1979) (void for vagueness). For a
general discussion of this issue, see Developments in the Law, supra note 66, at 1227-42.
82. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
83. Id at 221.
84. Id
85. Id at 238-39 (White, J., concurring). See also Stocklin-Enright, The Constitutionality of
Home Education: The Role ofthe Parent, the State and the Child, 18 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 562,
577 (1982).
86. 406 U.S. at 240 (White, J., concurring).
[Vol. 62:435
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diluted state interest in educating fourteen and fifteen year old children
who were socially acculturated and mentally developed.87 Second, the
Court accepted the proposition that the early teenage years were crucial
in determining whether a child would remain a part of the Old Order
Amish and, therefore, elevated the parents' interest in removing their
children from school.88
The exemption granted the Amish in Yoder should not be construed
as unlimited license for parents to control the education of their chil-
dren. At the outset, the Court noted: "There is no doubt as to the
power of a State, having a high responsibility for education of its citi-
zens, to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of
basic education. Providing public schools ranks at the very apex of the
function of a state."89 In addition, the Court stressed the self-contained
nature of the Amish community. 90 Apparently, the Court would not
have exempted the children in Yoder from public school attendance if
they seemed likely to become members of the mainstream society.91
Even if the children were to become part of the self-contained Amish
community, the Court would not have permitted their removal if they
were too young to have acquired basic academic skills.92 Finally, the
Court suggested that it would not accord a similar right to parents who
87. Id at 223-25. In response to this conclusion, Philip Kurland noted:
Never, I submit, has the concept of the importance of secondary education received such
a blow from the judiciary. Secondary education may not be regarded by a state as essen-
tial to "the physical or mental health of the child or to the public safety, order, or wel-
fare" of the state. What is the justification for compulsory secondary education then?
How could a state ever meet the burden placed on it by the Court here to show that it has
a valid interest in educating its children beyond the primary grades?
Kurland, supra note 57, at 229-30.
88. 406 U.S. at 217-18.
89. Id at 213.
90. Id at 215-17. The Amish Order is distinct from other religions in that their daily life and
religious practice stem from their literal adherence to "the Biblical injunction from the Epistle of
Paul to the Romans, 'be not conformed to this world."' Id at 216.
91. Id at 215-17. The majority paid little attention to evidence produced by the state that "a
significant number of Amish children do leave the Old Order." Id at 245 (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing). Instead, the majority assumed that the child would choose as an adult to remain in the
Amish community. Id at 224-25.
92. Id at 225 (Court recognized need for minimum academic standards to fulfill the "social
and political responsibilities of citizenship"). Significantly, the Court approvingly cited testimony
of education expert Donald Erickson "that the Amish succeed in preparing their high school age
children to be productive members of the Amish ommunity. ... [Tiheir system of learning
through doing the skills directly relevant to their adult roles in the Amish community [is] 'ideal'
and perhaps superior to ordinary high school education." Id at 212.
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wished to remove their child from school for nonreligious reasons. 93
The Court emphasized that "[the compulsory attendance law] carries
with it precisely the kind of objective danger to the free exercise of
religion that the First Amendment was designed to prevent. '94
Despite the fact-specific nature of the opinion, much in Yoder sug-
gests that parents have broad discretion to direct the upbringing of
their children. Of foremost importance, the Court concluded that the
state's communitarian and parenspatriae interests were not sufficiently
compelling to justify interference with family matters. According to
the Court, "this case, of course, is not one in which any harm to the
physical or mental health of the child or to the public safety, peace,
order, or welfare has been demonstrated or may be properly in-
ferred."95 The Court's willingness to look at the peculiar circumstances
of the case suggests that parents, at least in the religious liberty context,
will be able to make evidentiary showings as to the adequacy of their
child-rearing to exempt their children from otherwise reasonable state
education regulations. 96 Yoder also contains substantial language con-
cerning the parent's traditional rights in the child-rearing process. Ex-
emplary of this language is the Court's comment that " [t]he history
and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental
concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary
role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now estab-
93. The Court noted:
[T]he very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own
standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests.
Thus, if the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation and rejec-
tion of the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority . . .their claims
would not rest on a religious basis ... [nor] rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses.
Id at 215-16.
In many respects, this distinction between a parent's right to direct the religious upbringing of
his child and a parent's right generally to direct his child's upbringing is unpersuasive. Granted,
the religious liberty interest might form the basis of a stronger constitutional claim for exemption.
See, e.g., Boothby, Government Entanglement with Religion: What Degree of Proof Is Required?, 7
PEPPERDINE L. REV. 613 (1980); Devins, A Fundamentalist Right to Education?, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 21,
1983. Yet, parents have a fundamental liberty interest in deciding the general upbringing of their
children. See infra notes 200-229 and accompanying text. Consequently, any state infringement
on the parent-child relationship should demand of the state a demonstration that the intervention
will serve its professed goal.
94. 406 U.S. at 218.
95. Id at 230.
96. In this respect, the Court applied a different approach to the parent-state controversy in
Yoder than in Prince. See supra note 74.
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lished beyond debate as an enduring American tradition." '97 The Court
further noted that the parents' right to prepare their children for addi-
tional obligations extended to "the inculcation of moral standards, reli-
gious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship." 98 Finally, in the case
of free exercise challenges, the Court held that states should respect
parental decisions unless it appears that their decisions "will jeopardize
the health or safety of the child or have a potential for significant social
burdens."99
The Yoder Court did not, however, address the question whether an
Amish child might have an independent right to attend public high
school over his parents' objections."° Justice Douglas dissented on this
issue, noting that:
It is the future of the student, not the future of the parents, that is imper-
iled by today's decision. If a parent keeps his child out of school beyond
the grade school, then the child will be forever barred from entry into the
new and amazing world of diversity that we have today.10
This notion that children subrogate their rights to their parents is
supported by several other Supreme Court decisions. In Ginsberg v.
New York,"°2 for example, the Court upheld a state restriction on the
sale of pornographic literature to minors. The regulation did not pre-
vent parents from purchasing such literature for their minor children.
The Court recognized that constitutional guarantees are premised on
an individual's capacity for free choice. 10 3 Because children do not
possess the full capacity for individual free choice and they do not
know what is best for them, their parents' traditional role as their
champion is entirely appropriate."° Similarly, in Parham v. JR.,"°5 the
Court upheld a Georgia statute providing for admission to state mental
hospitals through parental request. After admission, the hospital staff
97. 406 U.S. at 232.
98. Id at 233.
99. Id at 234.
100. The majority contended that this "is not an issue in the case .... The State has at no
point tried this case on the theory that respondents were preventing their children from attending
school against their expressed desires .. " Id at 231.
101. Id at 245 (Douglas, J., dissenting). For analyses of the Yoder case that stress the chil-
dren's rights issue, see Knudsen, supra note 25; Note, Adjudicating What Yoder Left Unresolved"
Religious Rightsfor Minor Children After Danforth and Carey, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 1135 (1978).
102, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
103. Id at 650.
104. Id
105. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
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would decide whether the child should be released or kept under care.
The Court held that reliance upon the parental request was proper be-
cause the law presumes that parents possess both maturity and judg-
ment to guide their children, but more importantly, because the parent-
child bond will cause the parents to act in the best interest of their
child. 10
6
Support for the notion of parental control can also be found in a
106. Id at 602. John Garvey similarly commented:
It is the parents who are most familiar with the effects a particular design might have
on their child. They are also in the best position to understand the motives behind a
child's wishes and, indeed, to know what the child's unrepresented wishes are. A family
right to autonomy would maximize the communication between family members. More-
over, family members are likely to be more capable than the state of providing the kind
of continuing understanding and care necessary after any decision has been made that
affects the long-term welfare of the child.
Garvey, Child, Parent, State, and the Due Process Clause: An Essay on the Supreme Court's Recent
Work, 51 S. CALIF. L. REv. 769, 816-17 (1978). The presumption that parents act in the "best
interests" of their children also is evidenced by the fact that courts require parental consent gener-
ally for all but life-saving medical treatment. See Brown & Truitt, The Rights of Minors to Medi-
cal Treatment, 28 DEPAUL L. REv. 289 (1982); Ewald, Medical Decision Makingfor Children: An
Analysis of Competing Interests, 25 ST. Louis U.L.J. 689 (1982); Sokolosky, The Sick Child and the
Reluctant Parent-A Framework/or Judicial Intervention, 20 J. FAm. L. 69 (1981-82); see also cases
cited supra note 70.
Limiting this parental authority are several Supreme Court decisions that recognize the minor's
right to privacy to make decisions concerning abortion and birth control. Planned Parenthood of
Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), for example, invalidated a state statute that granted
parents an absolute veto over a minor child's right to have an abortion. Danforth is distinguish-
able from Parham and Ginsberg, however. In Parham, professionals at the state hospital ensured
that release was granted to sane children. Thus Parham, unlike Danforth, did not grant parents an
absolute power over their child's liberty interest. Ginsberg also is distinguishable from Danforth
on the ground that the quality of the right involved in Ginsburg is of a fundamentally different
nature than that in Danforth. Another case supporting the notion that children can act indepen-
dently of their parents is Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). Carey granted
minors a right to be free from blanket prohibitions against the distribution of contraceptives.
Unlike Danforth, a parental veto was not at issue in Carey. Although Carey and Danforth speak in
favor of a minor's right to act independently of their parents, minors who would be capable of
exercising this right are teenagers. Teenagers presumably are more mature than younger children.
Consequently, Danforth and Carey might not limit parental authority over children at an earlier
age. For a similar argument, see Note, supra note 57. Additionally, in Bellotti v. Baird, 433 U.S.
622 (1979), the Supreme Court suggested that a state could require minor children to obtain either
parental consent or court approval for an abortion. The Court observed that such a statutory
scheme would preserve the child's rights, and at the same time provide a legitimate reinforcement
of parental authority by the state. For the Court:
Properly understood, then, the tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with our
tradition of individual liberty; rather, the former is one of the basic presuppositions of
the latter. Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role,
may be important to the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make
eventual participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding.
Id at 638-39.
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group of Supreme Court cases that upheld constitutional claims made
by schoolchildren against actions taken by local boards of education.° 7
In this group of cases, the Court did not treat the children as autono-
mous actors and their parents as interfering with their autonomy.'
Finally, parental dominion over children apparently exists even when a
mature child seeks emancipation from his family. 09
Judicial deference to parental control thus often is grounded in prag-
matic terms. A recent commentary summarized the reasons for this
deference as follows: (1) parents are more sensitive to their child's
needs than the state can possibly be; (2) parents will probably act in the
child's best interest because of the close familial relationship; (3) the
parental right to control the child's upbringing preserves the diversity
of American society and serves as a barrier to state indoctrination. 0
The Yoder Court's exemption of Amish children from compulsory
attendance laws is the strongest Supreme Court statement on parental
authority over their children's education. To the extent that the Court
was addressing parents' religious claims, the Court's delineation of the
extent of parental authority holds true. Yoder, however, contains too
much language about the general authority of the state in education to
be considered a strong precedent in favor of nonreligious claims."'
107. See Island Tree Union School Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (right to receive informa-
tion); Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (equal educational opportunity-nationality); Goss v. Lo-
pez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (procedural due process); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973) (equal educational opportunity-race); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393
U.S. 503 (1969) (free speech); West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 614 (1943) (freedom of con-
science). But see supra notes 69 & 106 (discussion recognizing limitations both in the parent-child
bond and in parental authority over children).
108. Burt, Developing ConstitutionalRights of, in andfor Children, 39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
118, 123 (1975).
109. See, e.g., In re Polovchak, 97 Ill. 2d 212, 432 N.E.2d 873 (1983). Polovchak involved the
right of a twelve-year old to seek emancipation from his parents when his parents decided to
return to the Ukraine. Applying the standard that a minor should be separated from his parents if
he was incorrigible, a frequent runaway, or his acts posed serious hazards to himself or others, the
Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the parents had a right to retain custody of their child.
Because the United States had already granted the child asylum, the Polovchak decision is of little
practical significance. Yet, Polovchak does indicate the general unwillingness of courts to break
the parent-child relationship, even at the child's request.
1 I0. Developments in the Law, supra note 66, at 1354; see also supra note 107. In addition to
these pragmatic concerns, John Garvey noted that there is a legitimate parental interest in "living
one's life through one's children, [which] might be called the parent's right to exercise his religion
through the child, and to extend through the child ideas, language, and customs which the parent
believes to be important." Garvey, supra note 106, at 806.
111. See supra notes 82-94 and accompanying text. For a criticism of Yode/s elevation of
religious liberty claims over due process claims, see Kurland, supra note 57; supra note 93.
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Nonreligious claims find strong support in a group of decisions from
the 1920's that recognized the due process rights of parents to direct
their child's upbringing."1 2 The first case, Meyer v. Nebraska,"3 in-
volved a state regulation that prohibited the teaching of any language
other than English through the eighth grade. Under this regulation, a
court held a private tutor criminally liable for teaching German to an
elementary school student. The Supreme Court found the regulation
unconstitutional because "[a teacher's] right to teach and the right of
parents to engage him so to instruct their children. . . are within the
liberty of the [fourteenth] [a]mendment." i 4  The Meyer Court ac-
knowledged that "[t]he desire of the legislature to foster a homogene-
ous people with American ideals prepared readily to understand
discussions of civic matters is easy to appreciate."'1 5 Analogizing Ne-
braska's statute to Plato's Sparta," 6 the Court noted that such efforts to
homogenize the young represent "ideas touching the relationship be-
tween individual and State [that are] wholly different from those [plu-
ralistic notions] upon which our institutions rest ... 17
Expanding on Meyer, the Court in Pierce v. Society of Sisters"t8 ex-
plicitly recognized the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their
children. In Pierce, the Court held unconstitutional an Oregon statute
that required all children to attend public schools. The Court ruled
that the State could not outlaw private schooling and that the Oregon
statute would cause a state-imposed standardization that is contrary to
the fundamental theory of liberty upon which American government is
based. "The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nur-
ture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.""' 9
112. See cases cited in Knudsen, supra note 65, at 1511 n.24; see also infra notes 113-29. The
following discussion is adapted from Devins, State Regulation, supra note 4, at 363-65.
113. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
114. Id at 400.
115. Id at 402.
116. According to the Court, Plato recommended that parents raise their children in common
so that "no parent is to know his own child, nor any child his parent." Id at 401-02.
117. Id at 402.
118. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
119. Id at 535. The Court, however, recognized that:
No question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate all
schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils, to require that
all children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral char-
acter and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship
[Vol. 62:435
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In the last of the early twentieth century decisions, Farrington v.
Tokushiage,2° the Court held unconstitutional a statute that sought to
promote the "Americanism" of pupils attending foreign language
schools in the territory of Hawaii. This legislation gave the territorial
government the power to prescribe the schools' curriculum, entrance
qualifications, attendance requirements, textbooks, and teacher qualifi-
cations. In addition, the territorial government received the authority
to regulate the physical plant of schools, inspect facilities and teaching,
collect fees, and issue permits.' 2 ' The Court held that these regulations
violated the parents' due process rights and their right to control their
children's education. 122
The right of parental control has only questionable significance to
future challenges to state regulation. First, the Pierce, Meyer, and Far-
rington cases involved unusual regulations. The regulation in Meyer
was not related to a legitimate state interest. The statutes in Pierce and
Farrington completely eliminated the private school option. Most con-
temporary state regulations are related to a legitimate state interest and
are not as obtrusive on the private school option as the regulations in
Pierce and Farrington.123 Second, the judiciary in the early twentieth
century was extremely protective of individual rights that seemed
threatened by any form of governmental action.1 24 Presently, the
Supreme Court explicitly recognizes the constitutionality of reasonable
state regulations of private schools that promote a compelling state in-
terest in education. In Board of Education v. Allen,125 for example, the
Court observed that "[s]ince Pierce, a substantial body of case law has
must be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public
welfare.
Id at 534.
120. 273 U.S. 284 (1927).
121. Id at 291-95. See also J. Walther, State Regulation of Nonpublic Schools, 39 (1982)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois).
122. The Court stated:
They give affirmative direction concerning the intimate and essential details of such
schools, their control to public officers, and deny both owners and patrons reasonable
choice and discretion in respect of teachers, curriculum, and textbooks. Enforcement of
the Act probably would destroy most, if not all, of them; and, certainly it would deprive
parents of fair opportunity to procure for their children instruction which they think
important and we cannot say is harmful. The Japanese parent has the right to direct the
education of his own child.
273 U.S. at 298.
123. See supra notes 110-22 and accompanying text.
124. See LAW AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 32 (S. Goldstein & E. Gee, eds. 1980).
125. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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confirmed the power of the States to insist that attendance at private
schools, if it is to satisfy state compulsory-attendance laws, be at insti-
tutions which provide minimum hours of instruction, employ teachers
of specified training and cover prescribed subjects of instruction." 26 In
other words, because the state cannot abolish parochial schools, it must
satisfy its secular interests in education via private schools. Therefore,
the state must have the authority to regulate the secular educational
function of private schools.127 Numerous other Supreme Court deci-
sions have recognized the rights of a state to impose reasonable regula-
tions on its private schools. 128  But the Supreme Court has yet to
determine where it should draw the line between reasonable and un-
reasonable state regulations. 29
III. COURT DECISIONS
The state courts also have not satisf"ctorily resolved the issue
whether a state can constitutionally prohibit home instruction. Several
courts have intimated that no such constitutional right exists.' 30 Other
courts have recognized the possibility that such a right is grounded in
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment13 ' or the free exer-
126. Id at 245-46.
127. Id at 247.
128. See authorities cited in Note, supra note 38, at 811-12 n.59.
129. See Devins, supra note 93.
130. See Hanson v. Cushman, 490 F. Supp. 109, 114 (W.D. Mich. 1980) ("The plaintiffs'
claimed right to educate their children through a program of home study free from [state] require-
ment[s]. . . does not rise above a personal or philosophical choice, and therefore is not within the
bounds of constitutional protection."); Scoma v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 391 F. Supp. 455, 461
(N.D. IlM. 1974) (same); State v. Hoyt, 84 N.H. 38, 40, 146 A. 170, 171 (1929) ("The state being
entitled to supervise education, it is not an answer to a charge of failure to furnish supervised
instruction to show that equivalent unsupervised instruction is given."); Shoreline School Dist.
No. 412 v. Superior Court, 55 Wash. 2d 177, 346 P.2d 999, 1003 (1960), cerl. denied, 363 U.S. 814
(1960) ("We find no merit in the contention of the [parents] that they are excused from the penal-
ties of the compulsory school attendance law because school attendance is repugnant to their
religion.").
131. See Perchemlides v. Frizele, No. 16641, at 9 (Mass. App. Ct., Nov. 13, 1978) ("Nonreli-
gious as well as religious parents have the right to choose from the full range of educational
alternatives for their children."); Pierce v. New Hampshire State Bd. of Educ., 122 N.H. 762, 768,
451 A.2d 363. 367-68 (1982) (Douglas and Brock, J.L, concurring) ("approval requirements for
nonpublic school education may not unnecessarily interfere with traditional parental rights");
People v. Turner, 277 A.D. 317, 319-20, 98 N.Y.S.2d 886, 888 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950) ("provided
the instruction given is adequate and the sole purpose. . . is not to evade the statute, instruction
given to a child at home by its parent, who is competent to teach, should satisfy the requirements
of the compulsory education law").
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cise clause of the first amendment.1 32 Yet, all of these cases have in-
volved state procedures that did not foreclose the home study
alternative. In North Carolina, however, recent state and federal chal-
lenges to that state's absolute prohibition of home instruction address
this central issue.1 3
3
The first North Carolina suit, Duro v. District Attorney, Second Judi-
cial District,34 raises the general issue whether the state can prohibit
home instruction over the religious liberty objections of parents. In
August, 1982, federal district Judge F.T. Dupree, Jr., held the state pro-
hibition unconstitutional as applied to the Duro parents.135  The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned this decision in July,
1983.136 The Supreme Court declined review.' 37 The second lawsuit,
Delconte v. State, 38 raises the narrow issue whether a home can be
viewed as a private school for compulsory education purposes by satis-
fying state requirements for nonpublic schools. In January, 1983, a
North Carolina trial court answered the question in the affirmative.
139
The North Carolina Court of Appeals overturned the trial court. 140 The
Supreme Court of North Carolina has agreed to review the case.
The balancing of parental and state interests in North Carolina is
especially complicated because of a 1979 state enactment which effec-
tively deregulated nonpublic schools.14 1 Under this statute, a nonpub-
132. See State v. Nobel, Nos. S 791-0114-A, S-791-0115-A at 8 (Mich. Dist. Ct., Allegheny
County, Jan. 9, 1980) ("No evidence has been introduced in this case that would demonstrate that
the state has a compelling interest in applying teacher certification laws to the Nobels [parents] or
that the educational interest of the State could not be achieved by a requirement less restrictive on
the religious beliefs of the Nobels.").
133. Duro v. District Attorney, No. 81-13-Cov.-2 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 20, 1982), rev'd, 712 F.2d 96
(4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 998 (1984); Delconte v. State, 65 N.C. App. 262, 308 S.E.2d
898 (1983).
134. No. 81-13-Civ.-2 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 20, 1982), rev'd, 712 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1983), cer. denied,
104 S. Ct. 998 (1984).
135. No. 81-13-Civ.-2 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 20, 1982).
136. 712 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 998 (1984).
137. 104 S. Ct. 998 (1984). It has long been recognized that denial of certiorari by the
Supreme Court neither speaks to the merits nor constitutes a precedent regarding the grant or
denial of certiorari. See, e.g., United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923). Yet, there is
reason to think that denial of certiorari "shows a lack of strong belief that the decision below was
wrong and that it was important enough to be reversed by the Supreme Court." Linzer, The
Relevancy of Certiorari Denials, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1227, 1303 (1979).
138. No. 82-CVS--0176 (Harnett County Jan. 7, 1983); No. 8311-SC-371 (l1th Dist.).
139. Id
140. Delconte v. North Carolina, 65 N.C. App. 262, 308 S.E.2d 898 (1984).
141. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-378 (1980). The state legislature passed this statute in response
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lih school would satisfy state standards merely by maintaining
attendance and disease immunization records and by periodically ad-
ministering a nationally recognized student competency examina-
tion.142 The court's understanding of this statutory provision has been
determinative in North Carolina lawsuits. In Duro, the federal district
court concluded that the state's interest in education "is little more than
an empty concern."' 143 Relying, in part, on the Supreme Court's Wis-
consin v. Yoder decision,' 44 the district court held that because the
North Carolina legislature "has abdicated its interest in the quality of
education received by students in nonpublic schools in favor of 'the
rights of conscience,' "145 the state interest was outweighed by the par-
ents' religious liberty interest. In concluding that the state did not as-
sert a compelling enough interest to justify prohibiting home
instruction, the district court characterized the justification for the state
prohibition as hollow. North Carolina did not allow for home instruc-
tion because it had no mechanisms to assure that children in the home
were receiving adequate education. The district court did point out,
however, that the state did not have a mechanism to assure that chil-
dren in private schools were receiving an adequate education. 146
The district court decision, in many respects, was fact-specific. The
court did not decide whether nonreligious parents could prevail on a
similar claim. The court also emphasized that the state "could develop
a mechanism permitting home instruction under supervision .... ,,147
Finally, the court did not address the issue whether a state with com-
prehensive nonpublic school regulations could prohibit home study.
The Fourth Circuit reversal of the district court decision spoke in
more general terms. First, the appellate court "disagree[d] with the dis-
trict court that the state had abdicated its interest in the quality of edu-
cation received by students in nonpublic schools."'148 Deregulation, for
the appellate court, did not limit the state's compelling interest in com-
to a state court decision which upheld-over religious liberty objections--comprehensive regula-
tions of private schools, including teacher certification. State v. Columbus Christian Academy
No. 78 (Wake County, N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 1, 1978), vacatedas moot and dismissed, (N.C. May 4,
1979).
142. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-378 (1980).
143. No. 81-13-Civ.-2 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 20, 1982) at 7.
144. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See supra notes 82-109 and accompanying text.
145. id at 6.
146. Id at 6.
147. Id at 7.
148. 712 F.2d at 98.
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pulsory education. Apparently, the appellate court would view any
state regulation as preserving that compelling state interest. Second,
the Fourth Circuit held that Wisconsin v. Yoder did not provide a
source for the parents' constitutional interest in home instruction. The
appellate court viewed Yoder as a very narrow ruling--stressing the
"self contained" nature of the Amish community and the limited ex-
emption from secondary schooling sought by the Amish. 49 The appel-
late court, unlike the district court, did not view Yoder as balancing the
state's interest in compulsory education against the parents' religious
liberty interest.' Instead, the Fourth Circuit viewed Yoder as a fact-
specific holding inapplicable to other types of religious exemption
claims. Consequently, the appellate court rejected the parent's claim
because "Duro [the parent] has not demonstrated that home instruction
will prepare his children to be self-sufficient participants in our modem
society or enable them to participate intelligently in our political sys-
tem. . . .."It This ruling, by placing the burden of proof on the par-
ents, represents a dramatic shift from Yoder, which sought to balance
the competing interests of the parent and the state. Under the Fourth
Circuit ruling, the state apparently has an absolute right to prohibit
home instruction.
The Delconte lawsuit involves the fairly technical questions of
whether and when a home is the legal equivalent of a school. Unlike
the parents in Duro, the parents in Delconte sought to have the state
approve their home as a school.'52 The trial court in Delconte agreed
with the parents because their "home school" satisfied state regulations
governing nonpublic schools.'l 3
149. Id
150. Id ("The facts in the present case are readily distinguishable from the situation in Yoder.
The Amish were a 'rural self-sufficient community.' Additionally, the appellate court never ad-
dressed the issue whether parents might have a due process right to teach their children at
home."). See supra notes 112-29. Clearly, since Yoder recognized that religion-based claims were
more compelling than secular claims, the parents would have lost on this issue. See supra note 93.
Significantly, Mr. Duro's attorney never raised this issue in his brief before the appellate court.
151. 712 F.2d at 99. Significantly, in their statement of the facts, the appellate court noted that
"despite Duro's concern that his children be sheltered from corrupting influences, he admits that
when they reach eighteen years of age, he expects them to 'go out and work... in the world."'
Id at 97.
152. The state refused to approve the Delconte "school" because the Attorney General opined
that home instruction does not qualify as an approved nonpublic school. No. 82-CVS-01766
(Harnett County, Jan. 7, 1983).
153. Id at 10. In accordance with the district court ruling in Duro, the Delconte court noted
that even "[if the 'Hallelujah School' were not entitled to recognition as a 'qualified school,' the
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The state court of appeals disagreed and noted that the state legisla-
ture had failed to respond to formal state attorney general opinions that
a home school does not function as a qualified nonpublic school. The
court held "that 'school' means an educational institution and does not
include home instruction."'154
The appellate court also overturned the trial court ruling on the reli-
gious liberty issue. The appellate court viewed a total prohibition of
home instruction as permissible because "[t]he state [would otherwise
have] no means by which to insure that children who are at home are
receiving an education."1 55  In light of the United States Supreme
Court's denial of certiorari in Duro, it is unlikely that the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court would upset the Fourth Circuit's ruling on the reli-
gious liberty issue in Duro. Consequently, if parents are to prevail in
Delconle, it seems likely that they will prevail on statutory grounds. If
the North Carolina Supreme Court reverses on statutory grounds it will
grant to parents that which Duro might have denied them on constitu-
"tional grounds.1 56 At the same time, such a decision would not serve as
a precedent in favor of a parent's constitutional right to teach his child
at home.
Other state courts have struggled with the constitutional status of
home instruction, but none have approved a total prohibition as North
Carolina has. One explanation for the failure of courts to determine
whether parents have a constitutionally based right to teach their chil-
dren at home is that courts are able to characterize a home as a school
for compulsory school attendance law purposes.' 57 In People v.
enforcement of North Carolina's compulsory attendance law upon the plaintiff [parent) would
violate the plaintiff's rights under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. . . ." Id
154. Delconte, 65 N.C. App. at -, 308 S.E.2d at 903.
155. Id at -, 308 S.E.2d at 904.
156. The only difference would be that parents, under Delconte, must register their home
schools with the state.
157. Many courts in this situation are unwilling to characterize a home as a school, however.
See State v. Lowry, 191 Kan. 701,703, 383 P.2d 962, 964 (1963) ("To determine whether or not the
defendants [parents] were operating a private school, this court will look to the purpose, intent and
character of the endeavor."); State v. Hoyt, 84 N.H. 38, 39, 146 A. 170, 170-171 (1929) ("[the
courts require an institutional setting since] [t]he association with those of all classes of society, at
an early age and upon a common level, is not unreasonably urged as preparation for discharging
the duties of a citizen"); Knox v. O'Brien, 7 N.J. Super. 608, 72 A.2d 389 (N.J. Super. Ct, Law Div.
1950) (same position as the Hoyt court); Shoreline School Dist. No. 42 v. Superior Court, 55
Wash. 2d 177, 346 P.2d 999 (1960), cert. denied 363 U.S. 814 (1960) (same position as the Counort
court); State v. Counort, 69 Wash. 361, 363, 124 P. 910, 911 (1912) ("requirement [that children
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Levisen,158 for example, the Illinois Supreme Court interpreted the
state's public-or-private-school-only compulsory attendance law to per-
mit home study. The court characterized the Levisen home as a private
school because "[tihe object [of compulsory attendance] is that all chil-
dren shall be educated, not that they shall be educated in any particular
manner or place." 159 Consequently, the court found controlling evi-
dence that indicated that the Levisens' child was receiving equivalent
or superior instruction at home for five hours a day in all the required
courses, and that her academic performance was comparable to her
public school peers."6 Because of the court's disposition of the case, it
concluded that it was "unnecessary to consider the further contention
that the statute violates the constitutional right of parents to direct the
education of their child."'16'
Another reason why courts have not resolved the constitutional issue
is that it has never been squarely presented to the courts. In State v.
Lowry,'62 for example, the Kansas Supreme Court upheld a public-or-
private-school-only statute on statutory grounds because the only ques-
tion presented to the court was whether a home instruction program
constituted a private school. 163 Similarly, several home study lawsuits
have addressed secondary issues involving the permissibility of expan-
sive state regulation.'" These courts have not had to reach the thresh-
old constitutional issue because some type of home instruction
alternative was available in the state. Finally, attorneys representing
attend a local public school or approved private school] means more than home instruction; it
means the same character of school as the public school...").
158. 404 11. 574, 90 N.E.2d 213 (1950). For similar rulings, see Scoma v. Chicago Bd. of
Educ., 391 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. Il. 1974); State v. Peterman, 70 N.E. 550 (Ind. 1904).
159. 404 Il. at 577, 90 N.E.2d at 215. The court, however, went on to note that its decision did
"not imply that parents may, under a pretext of instruction by a private tutor or by the parents
themselves evade their responsibilities to educate their children." Id at 571, 90 N.E.2d at 215.
160. Id at 577, 90 N.E.2d at 214-15.
161. Id at 578, 90 N.E.2d at 216.
162. 191 Kan. 701, 383 P.2d 962 (1963). Similarly, in T.A.F. v. Duval County, 273 So. 2d 15
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) the parents failed to raise pertinent constitutional issues.
163. In In re Sawyer, 234 Kan. 436, 672 P.2d 1093 (1984), however, the Kansas Supreme Court
upheld the Kansas statute on constitutional as well as statutory grounds. Noting that education is
not a fundamental right, the Sawyer court held that, "Itihe standard of review to be applied then,
is whether the state's system has some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose." Id at
672 P.2d at 1098.
164. See, eg., Hanson v. Cushman, 490 F. Supp. 190 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (teacher certification);
Scoma v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 391 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (discretionary approval author-
ity vested in school district); T.A.F. v. Duval County, 273 So. 2d 15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973)
(qualified tutor); State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883 (N.D. 1980) (teacher certification).
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both the state 16 and parents' 66 have failed either to raise the "parental
rights" issue16 1 or to garner sufficient evidence supporting such a
claim.' 68
Although the authority of a state to prohibit home instruction is an
open question, the states permitting home study clearly have authority
to regulate the home educational option. In a study of home education
lawsuits, James Tobak and Perry Zirkel concluded: "[w]here the stat-
ute has an explicit exception and specific requirements for home study,
courts have adamantly rejected the arguments of parents that home
study qualifies as a private school. Similarly, courts have insisted upon
compliance with the procedural prerequisites specified in the stat-
ute." 169 An example of these parents' failure to demonstrate that home
instruction constitutes a private school is found in the Florida appellate
court decision of 2A.F v. Duval County. 70  In Duval, the appellate
court demanded that parents satisfy a state provision requiring that
home study be "at home with a private tutor who meets all require-
ments prescribed by law and regulation of the state Board of Educa-
tion."' 17 1 Parents in Duval sought to have their Christian home study
165. See supra note 132 (discussing State v. Nobel).
166. See State v. Moorhead, 308 N.W.2d 60, 64 (Iowa 1981) ("These objections to [equivalent
instruction provisions] were not raised in defendant's [parents] motion to dismiss. Nor does the
record show that they were raised at any other time prior to this appeal."); State v. Shaver, 294
N.W.2d 883, 893 (N.D. 1980) ("No attempt was made at the trial to show how compliance with
the law would affect the religion of the parents or the children."); State v. Kasuboski, 87 Wis. 2d
407, 413, 275 N.W.2d 101, 104 (Wis. Ct. App. 1978) ("The Kasuboskis did not present evidence on
an affirmative defense of attendance at an adequate private school.").
167. Of great significance, the Christian Law Association, one of the most active litigators of
parents' religious rights in home instruction lawsuits, refuses to raise the defense of excessive gov-
ernment entanglement with religion. These lawyers are strict separationists and thus claim that to
raise the defense of excessive government entanglement with religion is to concede that some
government intervention is permissible. See Minnery, Does David Gibbs Practice Law as Well as
He Preaches Church-State Separation, Christianity Today, Apr. 10, 1981, at 48. This separationist
tactic has been criticized both for its failure to recognize that some government regulations are
appropriate and for its weakness as a legal argument. See W. Ball, Memorandum to Our
Fundamendalist Christian Friends and Other Friends of Religious Liberty, Apr. 14, 1984 (copy on
file with author). For a discussion of cases where relevant constitutional issues were not raised,
see supra note 163.
168. See cases cited supra notes 165 & 166; see also State v. Riddle, 285 S.E.2d 359, 364 (W.
Va. 1981) ("[Dt is not appropriate for a person to entirely disregard the statute, await criminal
prosecution, and then assert a first amendment defense.").
169. Tobak & Zirkel, supra note 42, at 58.
170. 273 So. 2d 15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
171. Id at 17. Many states with specific regulations governing home instruction are more
comprehensive in their regulation of home study programs than in their regulation of nonpublic
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program classified as a private school and thereby avoid the private
tutor requirement. The Duval court required the parents to comply
strictly with the home instruction statutory procedures and did not dis-
cuss whether the "private tutor" requirement unjustifiably burdened
religious liberty interests.'72
More complex than the "home as private school" issue is the ques-
tion whether parents must comply with specific requirements for home
instruction. No case has adequately addressed this issue. Instead,
courts have narrowed their focus to the state's need for compliance
with state procedures governing the process of state approval of home
instruction. Typical of these decisions is an Ohio appellate court case,
Akron v. Lane.'73 Lane involved a parent's removal of his hearing-
impaired daughter from the public school system because he was dis-
satisfied with her progress in special education classes. Although the
parent provided for his daughter's instruction by engaging an allegedly
certified teacher of the deaf, he did not obtain a statutorily required
approval of his home study program. Consequently, he was charged
with violating Ohio's compulsory education law. The court found the
parent guilty, despite his claim that he was providing his daughter with
equivalent education. Affirming his conviction, the appellate court
held that the equivalency issue was "immaterial to the instant prosecu-
tion" because the parent did not comply with state procedures gov-
erning the approval of a home study program. 174 Lane was limited to a
question of statutory interpretation. Yet, even when the constitutional
right of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their children is at
schools. Consequently, parents in these states often try to have their home characterized as a
private school. TA.F .. Dural County presented such a situation. Another Florida case that
reached this conclusion is State v. N.M., 407 So. 2d 987 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). Rejecting the
parent's argument, the court stated: "That there is no statutory authority regulating the establish-
ment of private schools in Florida does not mean that Florida parents, unqualified to be private
tutors, can proclaim their homes to be private schools and withdraw their offspring from public
schools." Id at 990. For similar rulings, see People v. Turner, 121 Cal. App. 2d 861, 263 P.2d 685
(1953), appeal dsmissed, 347 U.S. 972 (1954); Grigg v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 356, 297 S.E.2d
799 (1982). For a discussion of why states might want to regulate home instruction more exten-
sively than private schools, see supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
172. See also Gunnison Watershed School Dist. v. Funk, No. 81-JV-2 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Gunni-
son County, Apr. 17, 1981) (parents similarly failed to raise the religious liberty issue in their
efforts to have their home study program recognized by the state as a private school).
173. 65 Ohio App. 2d 90, 416 N.E.2d 642 (1979).
174. Id at 95, 461 N.E.2d at 644. For a similar holding, see Gunnison Watershed School Dist.
v. Cox, No. 81-JV-2 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Gunnison County, Apr. 17, 1981); see also Tobak & Zirkel,
upra note 42, at 54-55 (discussing those and similar cases).
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issue, courts have similarly held that the parents must comply with
state procedures prior to adjudication of the constitutional issue. 17
Substantial doubt also exists over the extent to which a state has the
authority to require that home instruction must be equivalent to the
instruction provided in schools. To a large extent, the resolution of this
issue depends on where the courts place the burden of proof. Must the
parent establish equivalency or must the state establish non-
equivalency? 176  In constitutional challenges to "equivalency" stan-
dards, evidentiary or other problems have prevented the courts from
squarely addressing the parental rights and religious liberty issues. 177
Vague statutes, incomplete evidentiary records, and very narrow rul-
ings on the home instruction issue typify this body of case law. Conse-
quently, the scope of permissible state authority and the rights of
parents to direct the religious upbringing of their children remain
undefined.
In 1978, a Massachusetts trial court endorsed parental authority in a
secular context in Perchemlides v. Frizzle.178  Perchemlides held that
parents are constitutionally entitled to "the right to choose from the full
range of educational alternatives for their children." 179 The Perchem-
ides court was primarily concerned with preserving parental choice.
The Massachusetts court believed that it had to create "special stan-
dards" to maintain home instruction as a viable alternative. 80 The
court thus held that approval of a home instruction program should not
include such factors as the parents' motives, the lack of an identical
curriculum to that provided in the public schools, socialization, and the
creation of a precedent for future home instruction proposals if the
175. See State v. Moorhead, 308 N.W.2d 60 (Iowa 1981); Rice v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 244,
49 S.E.2d 342 (1948); State v. Riddle, 285 S.E.2d 359 (W. Va. 1981); State v. Kasuboski, 83 Wis. 2d
909, 275 N.W.2d 101 (1978).
176. Compare Jernigan v. State, 412 So. 2d 1241, 1247 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982) ("as we have
indicated, the defendants have not demonstrated that they can and will continue to provide an
equivalent education, and it is not incumbent upon the state to verify the same.") with State v.
Nobel, S-7-91-0114-A (Mich. Dist. Ct., Allegheny County, Jan. 9, 1980) (discussed supra note
132). For comprehensive discussion of the significance of burden of proof, see Tobak & Zirkel,
supra note 42, at 41-46; Lines, supra note 42, at 212-14.
177. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
178. Civil Act No. 16641 (Mass. Super. Ct., Nov. 13, 1978). For an excellent discussion of this
case, see S. ARONS, supra note 24, at 75-134.
179. Slip op. at 9.
180. Id at 11.
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plan was approved.' 8 ' The most significant aspect of Perchemlides is
the court's ruling on the "socialization" issue:
The question here is, of course, not whether the socialization provided in
the school is beneficial to a child, but rather, who should make that deci-
sion for any particular child. Under our system, the parent must be al-
lowed to decide whether public school education, including its
socialization aspects, is desirable or undesirable for their children. 8z
Although considered a significant victory for parents' rights, Perchem-
lides does not significantly constrict the discretion afforded public
school officials.
In stark contrast to Perchemlides, some state courts have held "social-
ization" to be an essential component of compulsory education. In its
1929 State v. Hoyt'8 3 decision, the New Hampshire Supreme Court up-
held a public-or-private-school-only statute by finding that it was not
unreasonable for the state to require education to include a "socializa-
tion" component.' 84 Similarly, two New Jersey courts have interpreted
the statutory language "equivalent instruction elsewhere than at public
school" to include "socialization."'' 85 In one of these cases, the court
was so bold as to state:
Education must impart to the child the way to live. This brings me to the
belief that. . . it is almost impossible for a child to be adequately taught
in his home. I cannot conceive how a child can receive in the home in-
struction and experiences in group activity and in social outlook in any
manner or form comparable to that provided in the public school' 86
A subsequent New Jersey decision nullified this opinion, labeling the
socialization rationale "untenable."' 8
Home study decisions also demonstrate conflicting judicial views
concerning the religious liberty interests of parents in the upbringing of
181. See Stocklin-Enright, supra note 85, at 598-99 (discussing Perchemlides).
182. Slip op. at 13.
183. 84 N.H. 38, 146 A. 170 (1929).
184. Id at 39, 146 A. at 170-71. Hoyt was severely restricted in New Hampshire in In re
Pierce, 122 N.H. 762, 451 A.2d 363 (N.H. 1982). See supra note 86 (discussing Pierce).
185. Stephens v. Bongart, 15 N.J. Misc. 80, 189 A. 131 (Essex County Ct., 1937); Knox v.
O'Brien, 7 N.J. Super. 608, 72 A.2d 389 (NJ. Div. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1950).
186. Stephens v. Bongart, 15 NJ. Misc. 80, 92, 189 A. 131, 137 (Essex County Ct., 1937).
187. State v. Massa, 95 NJ. Super. 382, 386, 231 A.2d 252, 255 (N.J. Div. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1967). But see In re Sawyer, 234 Kan. 436, -, 672 P.2d 1093, 1096 (1983) (citing favorable testi-
mony that, regardless of the parent's competence as a teacher "a school with more children would
be generally better for any child since it would provide more social interaction outside of the
home").
Number 3]
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
their children. In State v. LaBarge,'88 for example, the Vermont
Supreme Court noted that compulsory school attendance must-in
some instances-yield to first amendment concerns and thus a state
would find it difficult to relegate children only to "approved" educa-
tional institutions.'89 Similarly, in State v. Nobel,'9" a Michigan trial
court held that the state could not require parents to be certified if they
teach their children at home for religious reasons unless the state in-
troduces evidence that it "has a compelling interest in applying teacher
certification laws to the [parents] or that the educational interest of the
state could not be achieved by a requirement less restrictive on the reli-
gious beliefs of the [parents]."'' The Nobelcourt ruled in favor of the
parents, concluding that the state was only trying to apply teaching cer-
tification requirements uniformly and was not necessarily concerned
with the quality of the teaching. 192
Several state court decisions have rejected the religious liberty rights
of parents, however. In State v. Riddle,'93 for example, the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court rejected a religious liberty challenge to a state law
that required the local school superintendent to approve home study
programs. The court supported its holding as follows: "There are nu-
merous urgent public policy reasons for having all children between
the ages of 7 and 16 somewhere within the supervision of the county
boards of education." '194 This position evidences a skepticism to the
capability of parents to care for their children adequately. 9 Display-
ing a similar skepticism, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, in
Jernigan v. State,196 validated a state law requiring certified private
tutors to conduct home study programs. The court held that the law
did not improperly interfere with the parents' religious liberty rights
because the burden of proof is on the parents to demonstrate that they
188. 134 Vt. 276, 357 A.2d 121 (1976).
189. Id at 280, 357 A.2d at 124. LaBarge, however, was decided on statutory grounds.
190. No. S791-0114-A (Mich. Dist. Ct., Allegheny County, Jan. 9, 1980).
191. Id at 8.
192. Id at 10.
193. 285 S.E.2d 359 (W. Va. 1981).
194. Id at 364.
195. For example, the Riddle court also noted: "Our [public] schools not only teach, but they
are also responsible for ministering to the health needs of children by providing a reservoir of
professional expertise capable of ferreting out health-related problems at an early stage." Id In
light of the constitutionally protected right to attend nonpublic school, this justification seems
preposterous.
196. 412 So. 2d 1242 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982).
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can and will provide an equivalent education. 197 This rationale is to-
tally at odds with that of State v. Nobel 198 Other state courts have
avoided decisions on religious liberty rights by characterizing parental
claims as philosophical rather than religious.'99
IV. THE SCOPE OF LEGITIMATE STATE AUTHORITY
Resolution of the threshold constitutional issue of whether parents
have a right to educate their children at home arguably is contingent on
a determination of the nature of the state's interest in education.2°°
197. Id at 1247. See supra note 107 (discussing State v. Nobel).
198. The North Dakota Supreme Court decision, State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883 (N.D.
1980), is quite similar to Jernigan, however. In upholding a teacher certification requirement over
a religious liberty objection, the Shaver court contended that the judiciary should defer to state
education policy decisions because "courts are ill-equipped to act as school boards and determine
the need for discrete aspects of a compulsory school education program." Id at 889-900. This
position is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's recognition of the need for judicial scrutiny if
the state's actions "directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values." Epperson v. Ar-
kansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
199. See. e.g., State v. Moorhead, 308 N.W.2d 60, 64 (Iowa 1981) (religion was not an issue
because parents "did not present any evidence of their religious beliefs or of the manner in which
chapter 299 interferes with the exercise of those beliefs"); State v. Kasuboski, 87 Wis. 2d 407, 414,
275 N.W.2d 101, 105-06 (1978) ("[because] [ilt is only the auxiliary church operated by the
Kasuboskis in their home that has ... a tenet [mandating home study, it can be concluded]...
that the Kasuboskis removed their children from the public school on the basis of ideological or
philosophical beliefs .. ").
200. Government regulation that significantly burdens the free exercise of religion cannot
withstand constitutional challenge unless it represents "the least restrictive means of achieving
some compelling state interest." Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S.
707, 718 (1981). But the exemption of any religious activity from regulation is not constitutionally
required where it would "unduly interfere with the fulfillment of the [compelling] government
interest." United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982).
Constitutional standards under the due process clause are uncertain. Yoder suggests that the
state need not satisfy the "compelling interest-least restrictive means" test. See supra note 93. In
addition, some state courts have concluded that when parents do not establish state infringement
on sincere religious beliefs, which is necessary to trigger free exercise clause review, then the state
regulation need only bear a rational relation to some legitimate government interest. See, e.g.,
State v. Kasuboski, 87 Wis. 2d 407, 414, 275 N.W.2d 101, 106 (1978). Other courts, however, have
demanded that the state establish that its regulatory system further some "sufficiently substantial"
state interest. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text (discussing Perchemlides v. Frizzle);
see also In re Pierce, at 768, 451 A.2d at 367 (Douglas and Brock, J.J., concurring). ("[Wlhile the
State may adopt a policy requiring that children be educated, it does not have the unlimited power
to require that they be educated in a certain way at a certain place."). In the context of a Christian
school lawsuit, the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 201-18, 351
N.E.2d 750, 768-71 (1976), invalidated a comprehensive state regulatory scheme partially on the
ground that it improperly interfered with parents' liberty interest in directing the upbringing of
their children. Judicial recognition of the fundamental nature of parental rights in the upbringing
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The Yoder majority recognized both the state's communitarian interest
in effective citizen participation in the political system and the state's
parens patriae interest in ensuring that the state's youth develop the
skills necessary for economic self sufficiency.20 Both of these recog-
nized state interests are inexact terms subject to normative judicial
analysis. Varying judicial determinations on the constitutionality of
state regulations governing Christian schools indicate the subjective na-
ture of the analysis.202
Some educators view the state's communitarian interest in an edu-
cated populace as an interest in a populace that shares similar political
and social views. These educators are known as Cultural Transmission
theorists or Skinnerians. °3 For the Skinnerians, education is a means
for the state to maintain social order by perpetuating its value system.
Formal education then consists of transmitting the knowledge, the
skills, and the social and moral rules of the culture. In addition, Cul-
tural Transmission theorists view education as the oil which lubricates
of children supports the "sufficiently substantial" standard, not the rational relationship test. See
supra notes 64-81, 93 & 113-29; infra notes 202-22 and accompanying text.
201. Justice White, concurring in Yoder, argued that the state had a broader interest in antici-
pating the future needs of its young. See supra notes 85 & 86.
202. The current state of judicial decision-making in Christian school lawsuits is apparent in
the varying judicial perceptions of teacher certification requirements. In Kentucky State Bd. v.
Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1979), the Kentucky Supreme Court, in holding a teacher certifica-
tion requirement unconstitutional, contended that
[ult cannot be said as an absolute that a teacher in a nonpublic school. . . will be unable
to instruct children to become intelligent citizens .... mhe receipt of a 'bachelor's
degree from a standard college or university' is an indicator of the level of achievement,
but it is not a sine qua non the absence of which establishes that private and parochial
school teachers are unable to teach their students to intelligently exercise the elective
franchise.
Id at 884. The Ohio Supreme Court has similarly held such certification requirements unconsti-
tutional. State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 218, 351 N.E.2d 750, 771 (1976).
In stark contradiction to these decisions, the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld a teacher certifi-
cation requirement in State v. Faith Baptist Church, 207 Neb. 802, 301 N.W.2d 571 (Neb. 1981).
The Faith Baptist court argued as follows:
[I]t cannot be fairly disputed that such a requirement is neither arbitrary and unreasona-
ble. Additionally, we believe it is also a reliable indicator of the probability of success in
that particular field. We believe that it goes without saying that the State has a compel-
ling interest in the quality and ability of those who teach its young people.
Id at 816-17, 301 N.W.2d at 579.
A Nebraska court used similar reasoning in upholding comparable teacher certification regula-
tions. State v. Columbus Christian Academy, No. 78 (Wake County, Super. Ct., Sept. 1, 1978) at
14, vacating as moot, (N.C. May 4, 1979).
203. See Kohlberg & Mayer, Development as the Aim of Education, 42 HARv. EDUc. REV. 449,
452-54 (1972).
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and, hence, ensures the smooth operation of a predefined (by the state)
machine (the child).2"
In contrast to the Skinnerian approach,2"5 the progressive theory of
education holds that education should nourish the child's natural inter-
action with a developing society or environment. For the Progressives,
education plays an integral role in the development of a "successful"
human being. First, education aids the child's personal development as
an individual qua individual. Second, education serves to help create
or maintain a healthy state because education encourages the populace
to take an active role in the positive shaping of its environment. For-
mal education then serves as a way for the child to develop as an indi-
vidual who is a part of greater society. Progressive education theorists
view education as the acquisition and development of problem-solving
techniques so that children will be able to face the problems of "to-
morrow" without losing hold of either their personalities or their
culture.
Under the Progressive view, the state should encourage its citizens to
develop and refine their personal interests so that they can participate
effectively in the political marketplace. In other words, the state should
not attempt to breed homogeneity through its educational system.
Progressives emphasize the need to produce graduates capable of in-
dependent and critical assessment of American society.20 6
Progressive education theorists recognize that the state has a legiti-
mate interest in demanding that all students become literate and pos-
sess a basic understanding of the structure and underlying values of
government. Cultural Transmission theorists, on the other hand,
would grant the state much broader authority. These theorists believe
that the state should seek to inculcate in the child a set of state-selected
204. See Diamond, The First Amendment and the Public Schools, 59 TEx. L. REV. 477, 498
(1981) ("Sociologists generally accept the necessity of society's transmitting its cultural and moral
values to the next generation through a process of socialization; in the United States this socializa-
tion process occurs not only in the family, but also in the public education system.").
205. See Kohlberg & Mayer, supra note 203, at 454.
206. See Finn, Public Supportfor Private Education I, American Education, June, 1982, at 9
("Public policy should foster educational pluralism and diversity that are responsive to those dif-
ferences within the society rather than seeking to impose a uniform or homogeneous definition of
schooling."); Kamenshine, The First .4mendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 1104, 1134 (1979) ("The use of public schools to instill political values poses a serious
threat to the market place of ideas and the integrity of the democratic process."); see also Dewey,
Education as Politics, 32 New Republic 139 (1922); Katz, The Present Moment in Educational Re-
form, 41 HARV. EDUC. REV. 342 (1971).
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values. Although some courts have recognized the state's communitar-
ian interest in socialization,20 7 that view is now generally discredited.20 8
In fact, the Supreme Court's explicit recognition of a parent's right to
real choice in the shaping of his child's education undercuts much of
the communitarian interest espoused by Cultural Transmission theo-
rists.20 9 The Progressive's notion of communitarian interest is, how-
ever, consistent with these court decisions.210  The state, under its
communitarian interest, can legitimately mandate minimum academic
standards concerning basic academic skills and an understanding of the
nature of our political system. Yet, this communitarian interest would
not allow for the prohibition of home instructioi.
The state's parenspatriae interest, like its communitarian interest, is
subject to varying interpretation. Yoder explicitly recognized the state's
parenspatriae interest. "To be sure, the power of the parent, even when
linked to a free exercise claim, may be subject to limitation. . . if it
appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of
the child."' 21  This vaguely defined interest, on the one hand, could
allow the state to regulate fairly specific details of child rearing. On the
other hand, interpreted differently, this formulation of the state's inter-
est might grant parents nearly unlimited authority in the upbringing of
their children.
One theory supporting the prohibition of home instruction or the de-
velopment of expansive regulations governing home study under the
state'sparenspatriae interest is the "other guy" rationale.1 2 The "other
guy" approach holds that without regulations, parents will abuse the
system and improperly educate their children. Under this theory, regu-
lations are appropriate in instances where a state cannot afford to trust
parents to direct the upbringing of their children. Proponents of ex-
207. See supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 130 & 182. Also supporting this conclusion is the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Board of Educ. Island Trees Union School Free Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
Pico prohibited school boards from removing library books for ideological reasons. By holding
that the first amendment protects a student's right to receive political information, the Court sug-
gested that social homogenization is not a proper goal of education. See also supra notes 123-29
and accompanying text (discussing parental rights to send children to private schools over similar
state homogenization objections).
209. See supra notes 112-29 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 205 & 206.
211. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34 (1972).
212. This label is borrowed from an essay by Robert Baker, R. BAKER, STATUTE LAW AND
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION IN THE TWELVE YEAR SENTENCE (Rickenbacker ed. 1974).
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pansive state parenspatriae powers in education generally support the
Cultural Transmission theory of education.
The "other guy" approach is not universally accepted. Many feel
that state intervention should be a matter of last resort. Psychologist
Joseph Goldstein, for example, concluded his analysis on state supervi-
sion of parental autonomy in the health care field by noting that the
lack of societal consensus regarding state intrusion into parental auton-
omy justifies a check on "the use of state power to impose highly per-
sonal values on those who do not share them."213 In a similar vein,
Professor Robert Burt commented that there is a natural presumption
favoring the parents and limiting state intervention into the parent-
child bond.214
Under an expansive "other guy" approach, the state might well be
able to justify a total prohibition of home instruction. Home instruc-
tion, after all, grants more responsibility to the family than any other
educational alternative. This view is in conflict with the general trust
accorded parents in the upbringing of their children, however.21 5 For
example, the common law view presumed that the parents' natural af-
fection for their children as well as their knowledge and superior op-
portunities to discover the child's capabilities would ensure that the
parents promoted the child's best interests.2"6
In addition to the parents' unique ability to act in the best interest of
their children, children generally approve of their parents' actions and
want to keep the child-parent bond strong.217 For example, one recent
213. Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk- On State Supervention of Parental.Auton-
om;', 86 YALE L.J. 645, 670 (1977).
214. According to Professor Burt:
A presumption favoring parents corresponds both to the social reality that state child
rearing interventions are inherently difficult enterprises and to the psychological reality
that an intensely intimate bonding between parent and child lays the best developmental
foundation for this society's most prized personality attributes. A court should view all
state claims to contravene parental desires with the same skeptical eye-but it should be
prepared to sanction all interventions that satisfy its generally applicable criteria.
Burt, supra note 108, at 127.
215. Id
216. See Trustees of Schools v. People, 87 IlL. 303, 308 (1877); see also references listed in
Moskowitz, Parental Rights and State Education, 50 WASH. L. REV. 623, 623-26 (1975).
217. See Burt, supra note 108, at 128-32; see also J. BOWLBY, CHILD CARE AND THE GROWTH
OF LOVE 80 (1965) ("Efforts made to 'save' a child from his bad surroundings and to give him new
standards are commonly of no avail, since it is his own parents, for good or ill, he values and with
whom he is identified."). But see D. HOULGATE, CHILDREN, PATERNALISM, AND RIGHTS TO LIa-
ERTY, in HAVING CHILDREN (0. O'Neill & W. Ruddick, eds.) (arguing in favor of a mature child's
right to self-development).
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court decision recognized that "[a] child is not a creature of the state. A
child's first allegiance is to his family and parental rights and responsi-
bilities in the education of children come before the state's."2 8 For the
past fifteen years, courts have recognized the propriety of parental con-
trol and limited state intervention into family affairs on several consti-
tutional grounds.219
The increasing recognition of parental authority limits but does not
undercut the state's parens patriae authority in nonpublic education.
The state clearly has a legitimate interest in ensuring that all children
are afforded the opportunity to become viable members of contempo-
rary society. Yet, the state must demonstrate that its actions will serve
this legitimate purpose before it interferes with the parent-child rela-
tionship. Robert Burt, looking at Supreme Court decisions protecting
other "fundamental rights" from state intrusion, suggested the follow-
ing standard: "[1] Has the need for state intervention been convinc-
ingly identified, and [2] is there a close correspondence between that
need and the means proposed to satisfy that need. 220 In other words,
"when the state contravenes parental decisions in child rearing with the
claimed purpose of benefiting the child, the state must present a con-
vincing case that its intervention, in fact, will serve its professed
goal. ' 221
A state would be hard pressed to justify a total prohibition of home
instruction under the Burt standard. North Carolina, in the Duro law-
suit, contended that it "'does not permit home instruction because [it]
has no mechanism by which to assure that children in a home with
their parents are provided access to any education whatsoever.' ",222
This justification seems spurious because the state could demand that
home study students be taught by a capable teacher or pass competency
examinations. In short, it would appear that the state could satisfy its
parenspatriae interest in education through less restrictive means than
the total prohibition of the home study alternative.
The state clearly has authority to impose some regulations on home
study programs. It is, however, difficult to draw the line separating per-
218. Milliken v. Green, 389 Mich. 1, 57-60, 203 N.W.2d 457, 483 (1972), vacated, 390 Mich.
389, 212 N.W.2d 711 (1973).
219. See supra note 93.
220. Burt, supra note 108, at 127.
221. Id
222. Duro v. District Attorney, No. 81-13-Civ.-2 at 6 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 20, 1982).
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missible from intrusive regulations. Regulations governing core curric-
ulum, length of school day and school year, student reporting, and
competency examinations are clearly constitutional. Expansive curric-
ulum requirements or state prescribed textbooks, however, are uncon-
stitutional.223 The real difficulty lies in the evaluation of intermediate
curriculum and teacher certification requirements. Teacher certifica-
tion is a particularly knotty issue because in many cases requiring certi-
fication will effectively foreclose the home study alternative.
Considering that competency examinations can ensure adequate
achievement prior to academic advancement, it would appear that
teacher certification requirements that are so stringent as to preclude
the home education option probably are unconstitutional.224
Competency examinations provide the best vehicle to balance the
state's interest in an educated populace against a parent's interest in
directing the upbringing of his children.225 State objections to achieve-
ment tests are unconvincing as a policy matter. The state contends that
its objective is not merely to identify those students who do not learn
their lessons; rather, it is to promote the likelihood that the educational
system will provide every child with the basic education to function
effectively in society. Thus the State may view after-the-fact regula-
tions as an ill-fitted substitute for state-imposed educational standards.
Underlying (and ultimately fatal to) this argument is a presumption
that a substantial enough number of home study students will fail to
justify state-imposed burdens on pluralism, religious liberty, and pa-
rental rights. The evidence, however, is to the contrary.226 If anything,
it appears that parents who teach their children at home are doing a
223. Court rulings on the analogous issue of the constitutionality of state regulations gov-
erning Christian day schools support this conclusion.
224. The state can still require ad hoc determinations of competency. The state, however,
probably cannot demand that parents comply with such formalistic criteria as receipt of a college
diploma.
225. For an alternative suggestion, see Note, Home Instruction: An Alternative to Institutional
Education, 18 J. FAm. L. 353, 374-77 (1978-80) (recommending home visits and other types of
professional evaluation).
226. See Tax-Exempt Status of Private Schools: Hearings Before the Subcomm on Oversight of
the House Comm on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 554-56 (1979) (Testimony of Dr. Paul
Kienel, Executive Director of the Association of Christian Schools International). It is also worth
noting that "the prosecutor on the trial of the Whisner case objected to the introduction of the
Stanford Achievement Test scores on the Tabernacle Christian students as irrelevant and immate-
rial. Apparently, the State took the position that compliance with the minimum standards was
indispensable to an adequate education." Rice, supra note 27, at 886.
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better job than the public schools. 2 2 7 Courts that have addressed this
issue in the control of state regulation of Christian schools are evenly
divided on the adequacy of competency tests issue.228
V. CONCLUSION
It is impossible to provide a hard and fast determination of what the
state can and cannot do in its regulation of home study programs. Yet,
neither the state's communitarian interest in a well-functioning open
political system, or its parenspatriae interest in the eventual economic
self-sufficiency of its youth, is sufficiently strong to justify a total prohi-
bition of home instruction.229  A parent's right to direct the religious
upbringing of his child should carry with it the right to a meaningful
home study option. It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court passed up
the opportunity to review the Duro case. Until the Supreme Court
chooses to review this issue, it appears that the basic questions concern-
ing parental authority in the instruction of their children will be dis-
cerned through an entangled body of state court decisions.
227. See Heard, Church-Related Schools: Resistance to State Control Increases, Educ. Wk.,
Feb. 17, 1982, at 1, 10, 18.
228. Compare Kentucky State Bd. v. Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877, 884 (Ky. 1979) (encourages the
use of such tests) with State v. Faith Baptist Church, 207 Neb. 802, 816-17, 301 N.W.2d 571, 579-
80 (1981) (criticizes the use of such tests).
"Christian schools have generally been willing to submit their 'product' voluntarily to reason-
able evaluation by the State through achievement testing." Note, State Regulation of Private Reli-
gious Schools in North Carolina-A ModelApproach, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 405, 416 (1980).
Christian school leaders, however, have expressed concern that the state may impose otherwise
impermissible curriculum requirements through extensive testing. See Ball, supra note 13, at 337-
38. It should also be noted that many Christian school leaders and some courts contend that the
state can satisfy its interest in education by requiring that Christian school students take and
perform satisfactorily on a nationally recognized achievement test. See Kentucky State Bd. v.
Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877, 884 (Ky. 1979); Devins, supra note 93. This position, however, has been
rebuked by some commentators and courts. See, e.g., State v. Faith Baptist Church, 207 Neb. 802,
813-17, 301 N.W.2d 571, 578-80 (Neb. 1981).
229. For a similar conclusion, see Note, The Right to Education: .4 Constitutional.4nalss, 44
U. CIN. L. REV. 796, 809 (1975) ("At the very least the substantive due process theory calls into
question the constitutionality of compulsory education for many children."); Note, Home Educa-
tion in America" ParentalfRihts Reasserted, 49 UMKC L. REv. 191, 206 ("any compulsory educa-
tion statute which does not allow [or places severe limits on] home instruction . . . should be
struck down as violative of the Constitution").
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